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Why do Cross-border Merger/Acquisition Deals become Delayed, or 
Unsuccessful? – A Cross-Case Analysis in the Dynamic Industries 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze three litigated cross-border inbound acquisitions that 
associated with Asian emerging market-India, namely Vodafone-Hutchison and Bharti Airtel-
MTN deals in the telecommunications industry, and Vedanta-Cairn India deal with oil and 
gas exploration industry. To do so, we adopt a legitimate method in qualitative research, that 
is, case study method and thereby perform a unit of analysis and cross-case analysis. We 
suggest that government officials’ erratic nature and ruling political party influence were 
more in foreign inward deals that characterize higher bid value, listed target company, cash 
payment, and stronger government control in the industry. Importantly, the liability of 
foreignness and liability of localness was found to be severe in Indian-hosted deals that 
describe higher valuation, cash payment and dynamic industry. We eventually propose 
implications of mergers and acquisitions for extractive industries thus to enhance productivity 
and improve welfare measures during post-integration phase.     
 
JEL Classification: G34 
Keywords: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions; Foreign direct investment; Oil and gas 
exploration industry; Telecommunications industry; Institutional theory; legal and regulatory 
framework; Internationalization. 
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1. Introduction 
A thoughtful idea, well-designed policy approach of liberalization and globalization of 
international monitoring organizations has high impact on economic performance and 
dynamic industries in developing and transition economies. In particular, the market for 
corporate control activities such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) at the global level has 
seen a significant change both in frequency of deals and value of transactions all over the 
world, especially after 2000. For instance, number (value) of cross-border M&As has 
markedly increased by 206% (875%) from 3,460 (US$98.38 billion) in 1990 to 10,576 
(US$959.34 billion) in 2000, then 12,199 (US$1,045 billion) in 2007, after declining to 8,624 
(US$348.75 billion) in 2013. While referring to dynamic industries, we observe a similar 
trend in sampling sectors, namely mining, quarrying and petroleum, and information and 
communication. In case of mining, quarrying and petroleum sector, number (value) of cross-
border inbound M&As has significantly increased from 204 (US$7 billion) in 1990 to 1,026 
(US$147.64 billion) in 2011, then turned down to 625 (US$60 billion) in 2013. For instance, 
in the crude petroleum and natural gas segment, Petronas Carigali- a Canadian company 
acquired Progress Energy Resources for US$5.4 billion; CNOOC Canada Holdings bought 
100% shareholding in Nexen Inc for US$19.1 billion; and OMV AG- an Austrian company 
acquired a 19% shareholding in Norway-based Statoil ASA-Gullfaks Field for US$3.2 
billion. While, in the case of information and communication sector, number (value) of cross-
border inbound M&As has appreciably increased from 205 (US$11 billion) in 1990 to 1,806 
(US$414 billion) in 2000, thereafter it has seen rise and decline, and reached to 734 (US$31 
billion) in 2013. For example, in the telephone communications, Japan-based SoftBank Corp 
bought a 78% stake in US-based Sprint Nextel for US$21.6 billion (UNCTAD, 2013, 2014). 
As explored in earlier studies, the market for international trade and direct investments all 
over the world has seen a depressing trend due to recent global financial crisis and its adverse 
effect on border crossing business transactions and trade relations. Though, emerging market 
enterprises have taken advantage of the lower asset valuations and thereby opened a market 
for outbound acquisitions (e.g., Reddy, Nangia, & Agrawal, 2014b). 
However, we found that cross-border transactions involving emerging markets often 
delay, litigate, or invite government and political influence. In a recent study, Zhang, Zhou, 
and Ebbers (2011) mentioned that 32% (210,183) of acquisition attempts have uncompleted 
during 1982-2009 period (p. 226). Indeed, these facts and experiences have motivated many 
researchers in strategy, international business and corporate finance. For instance, earlier 
studies performed in different institutional settings suggest that not only deal- and firm-
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specific factors and home-host country bilateral trade relations but also host-country specific 
attributes such as quality of institutional and regulatory framework, accounting reporting and 
investor protection, macroeconomic indicators, financial markets development, border tax 
policies, government and bureaucrat’s behavior, political influence, physical distance and 
cultural factors have significant impact on cross-border merger/acquisition deals completion 
(e.g., Alguacil, Cuadros, & Orts, 2011; Barbopoulos, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2012; Blonigen, 
1997; Bris & Cabolis, 2008; di Giovanni, 2005; Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012; Ezeoha & 
Ogamba, 2010; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2008; Hebous, Ruf, & Weichenrieder, 2011; 
Huizinga & Voget, 2009; Hur, Parinduri, & Riyanto, 2011; Pablo, 2009; Rose, 2000; Rossi & 
Volpin, 2004; Scholes & Wolfson, 1990; Schöllhammer & Nigh, 1984, 1986; Uddin & 
Boateng, 2011). In addition, recent studies have emphasized on economic nationalism and 
institutional role in approving cross-border deals include direct investment, mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures and private equity proposals, particularly in emerging markets 
(e.g., Ferreira, Santos, de Almeida, & Reis, 2014; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; 
Reis, Ferreira, & Santos, 2013; Serdar Dinc & Erel, 2013; Xu & Meyer, 2013). In fact, 
emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and other European 
regions provide a unique setting for various reasons include testing extant theory and building 
new theory (e.g., Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). 
Motivated by these factors, we analyze three litigated cross-border acquisitions that 
hosted by Asian market-India, namely Vodafone-Hutchison and Bharti Airtel-MTN deals in 
the telecommunications sector, and Vedanta-Cairn India deal with oil and gas exploration 
industry. In other words, this paper will provide answers to the following research questions. 
Do host country financial markets and institutional guidelines (e.g., open offers program, dual 
listing, and international taxation) favor international acquisitions? Do host country 
regulatory or statutory authorities adversely behave in foreign transactions such as FDIs and 
M&As. Do host country politicians (e.g., ruling political party) interfere in overseas 
investment transactions? Does host country weak institutional laws’ relating to investor 
protection and taxation affect its sovereign revenue, and acquirer/target firm in unsuccessful 
overseas inbound deals? To accomplish this goal, we adopt qualitative case study method 
both for deep understanding about deals happening in emerging markets and for adding new 
knowledge to the existing literature on cross-border M&As. The unit of analysis and cross-
case analysis of sampling cases would benefit not only researchers in management but also 
help multinational managers participating in overseas deals particularly refer to dynamic 
industries such as oil and gas exploration, mining, information and communications, 
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automobile, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, metals, electrical and electronic, and finance and 
banking institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents review of the 
literature addressing cross-border M&As for various reasons. Section 3 describes research 
design that refers to multi-case approach, selection criteria and sampling cases. Section 4 
discusses analysis of sampling cases. Section 5 illustrates a cross-case analysis. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
   
2. Review of the literature 
A merger/acquisition occurs between two local firms is referred as a domestic merger, 
because the transaction has closed within the territory of a country. Conversely, a 
merger/acquisition occurs outside the territory of a country is defined as an offshore deal. In 
recent times, the success or failure of an international acquisition has attracted the attention of 
scholars in both developed and developing economies. Thus, success or failure means 
“completion or incompletion of an announced acquisition”, “agreement, or disagreement of 
the deal”. Albeit, very few studies have examined the causes of failure deals in developed 
economies context, while there is limited research on emerging markets perspective. In 
general, firm-specific, country-specific and deal-specific factors play a major role both in 
domestic and in overseas deals. While arriving at a conclusion of the existing studies, most 
acquisitions fail to create a synergistic value to the acquiring firm shareholders in both ex-
ante and ex-post stages (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). For 
instance, 80% of M&As failed to create value to the shareholders in which 53% of 
acquisitions really destroyed the shareholder value (in Marks & Mirvis, 2011, p. 162). 
In Bargeron, Lehn, Moeller, and Schlingemann (2014), Calandro (2011), and Epstein 
(2005), the authors mentioned that acquisition agreements often fail because of a lack of 
careful evaluation of the target firm, paying a high premium for target, deal structure and 
experience of bidding firm managers, prospects of the combined entity, and acquiring targets 
similar to those competitors. In some instances, failures happen because of communication 
bottlenecks (Grantham, 2007). In other words, Morrison, Kinley, and Ficery (2008) showed 
operational due diligence and quality checks might break merger negotiations, whereas 
Galpin and Herndon (2008) discussed how mergers go wrong and suggested some guidelines 
within the setting for a repair. In particular, Zhang et al. (2011) mentioned that “target 
management resistance to acquisition bids, managerial ownership, target company size, deal 
structure … and the level of bid premiums offered in takeovers and ownership structure 
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determine the end results of acquisition attempts” (p. 226). In sum, success by announcing 
cross-border acquisition between target and bidder not only influenced by firm- and deal-
specific factors, but also determined by national characteristics such as economic, financial, 
legal, political and cultural environment. Hence, quality of acquiring firm managers, 
involvement of senior managers (Epstein, 2005), prior deal experience and association with 
host country government through local player, and so forth of institutional factors determines 
the success of foreign acquisitions (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012). 
We found three interesting studies that examine a failed international telecom merger 
in the Scandinavian region. Fang, Fridh, and Schultzberg (2004), and Meyer and Altenborg 
(2007, 2008) analyzed the failed merger between Telia in Sweden and Telenor in Norway. 
The merger proposal has been called-off after 11 months of the announcement. They found 
that (i) disintegrating factors (e.g., distributive equality, operationalization of the equality 
principle, integrative equality, and a mix of equality) were strong, because merger involving 
two state-owned firms of unequal size, (ii) strategies adopted by merging firms found to be 
incompatible or unsuited (refers to that “it is not feasible for the merged corporation to 
choose both strategies simultaneously”), (iii) merging firms acquisition strategies were 
influenced by pre-merger strategies, (iv) merger also intervened by both countries' national 
political behaviour and governance structures. Importantly, Fang et al. (2004) suggested that 
“historical sentiments, feelings and emotions, if not handled well, can cause fatal damage to 
cross-cultural business ventures”. They also mentioned three important reasons behind the 
failure: lack of personal trust between merging parties in the middle and later phase of deal 
making, both parties were wrong about estimating potential complexities and cultural 
differences, and both countries national relations illustrated as ‘big brother vs. little brother’ 
syndrome. Further, we also noticed an interesting oil deal among developed and developing 
countries in 2005, but resulted unsuccessful between CNOOC in China and Unocal in US 
(Wan & Wong, 2009). The authors found that takeover negotiations were broken due to 
political intervention. The takeover announcement also affected other companies in the US-
oil industry in which they noticed a significant decline in market value of those non-merging 
oil companies. Whereas, stock prices of non-merging companies fell “in anticipation of a 
lower future takeover probability and expected takeover premium” (p. 454). 
Interestingly, Neuhauser, Davidson, and Glascock (2011) analyzed stock performance 
of the target firm involving failed acquisition attempts (merger cancellations and three types 
of takeover failures: greenmail, simple withdraw and share repurchase) for a sample of 530 
transactions during 1978-2004 period. They reported positive abnormal returns on acquisition 
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announcement, while finding negative returns on both ‘during the interim period and failure 
announcement’. Target firm shareholders have received significant higher abnormal returns 
around the acquisition announcement that later cancelled due to voluntary withdrawal or 
share repurchases compared to acquisition attempts that later failed because of a cancelled 
merger or greenmail. The returns found to be low when the announced deal actually 
cancelled in the above cases. Lastly, they suggested that even cancelled takeover attempts 
offer positive returns to target shareholders. In another study, Bargeron et al. (2014) 
examined bidder returns around disagreement over mergers for 623 transactions between 
1996 and 2006. They found an inverse relation between bidder returns and information 
uncertainty regarding deal disagreement, whilst noticed a significant relation among 
announcement returns and chances of deal completion when such returns are more 
informative to bidders. 
In case of successful acquisitions, Duncan and Mtar (2006) analyzed the international 
deal between FirstGroup of UK and Ryder of US in the transport business and described that 
previous international acquisition experience of acquiring firm has a positive relationship 
with subsequent acquisition success. Hence, higher post-merger value found to be possible 
when acquiring firm pay more attention to strategic fit, cultural fit and integration aspects. 
With this backdrop, we analyze the host-nation’s institutional role and its impact on 
foreign acquisition’s completion. 
 
3. Research design: a Multi-Case Study 
Case study method is a legitimate tool in qualitative research, which aims to perform in-depth 
analysis on a single unit, or multiple units in the given setting. Qualitative researchers suggest 
that the case study method recommends two directions, namely to answer ‘why and how’ 
questions, and to build theory from thick evidence (Stake, 1994; Yin, 2003). For instance, 
recent studies have used the case method for various tasks and thereby blended the analysis 
using not only primary data, but also linking with secondary data [media texts] (e.g., Child & 
Tsai, 2005; Geppert, Dörrenbächer, Gammelgaard, & Taplin, 2013; Halsall, 2008; Kim & Lu, 
2013; Reddy, 2015a, 2015b; Riad & Vaara, 2011; Serdar Dinc & Erel, 2013; Tienari, Vaara, 
& Björkman, 2003; Vandenberghe, 2011; Wan, 2014; Wan & Wong, 2009). We also find 
that few studies conducted case analysis based on published cases (Conklin, 2005). Specially, 
Ambrosini, Bowman, and Collier (2010) proposed a framework for using teaching case 
studies in management research.  
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We have thus adopted multi-case study approach to perform both individual case 
analysis and cross-case analysis of sampling cases. To do so, we chose three published cases 
based on the selection criteria. For example, case researchers should observe, “relevance 
rather than representativeness is the criterion for case selection” (Stake, 1994). Hence, a case 
should meet all six rules, to be included in the sampling cases. First, the deal or transaction 
should be a cross-border inbound acquisition in which the interested multinational firm has 
shown interest to merge with an Indian local company, or to buy at least 25% of equity stake 
in the Indian local company. Second, both acquiring firm and target entity should be publicly 
traded stocks in a stock exchange where the registered office is located, and the stocks should 
have a fair-trading for at least two years before the announcement. Third, neither acquirer nor 
target firm has a dispute (e.g., tax evasion) with the Indian tax department for at least three 
years before the announcement. Fourth, a country where the acquiring firm registered should 
have friendly relation with India for at least 10 years before the announcement; however, 
there could be institutional overlaps and misunderstanding, but not a war. Fifth, the deal or 
transaction value should not be less than $5.00 billion, and the type of deal could be cash, 
stock, or a mix. Finally yet importantly, the announced deal could be a long-time delayed, 
broken and/or litigated because of forced regulatory or political intervention. The issue could 
be a dual listing, corporate ownership, open offers, deal structure (e.g., foreign exchange 
issue), and international taxation. Here, litigation means the deal might force to be petitioned 
in the sovereign court. 
Therefore, the number of units in our case research is three. The basic unit of analysis 
aims to capture the causes behind ‘delayed and unsuccessful cross-border inbound 
acquisitions in emerging markets setting’. Thus, cross-border inbound cases connected to 
India are (i) Vodafone acquisition of Hutchison for US$11.2 billion in 2007 (Reddy, 2015b; 
Reddy et al., 2014a), (ii) unsuccessful cross-border merger between Bharti Airtel and MTN 
for US$23 billion in 2008-09 (Reddy et al., 2012), and (iii) Vedanta Resources acquisition of 
Cairn India for US$8.67 billion in 2010-11 (Nangia, Agarawal, Sharma, & Reddy, 2011). In 
other words, two cases were representing telecommunications industry and remaining case 
was describing oil and gas exploration industry. 
The major characteristics of selected cases include – (i) deal was related to 
telecommunications business, acquirer: Vodafone, target: Hutchison and the deal had been 
litigated due to international capital gains taxes connected to the host country-India; (ii) deal 
was related to telecommunications business, which is a failure deal between Indian-based 
Bharti Airtel and South African-based MTN group. The transaction defined to be ‘cross-
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merger’ in which both companies will offer services in the two countries by the cross (dual) 
listing in the given economic settings; (iii) case was related to the energy sector in which UK-
registered Vedanta Resources acquired the UK-based Cairn Energy’s equity ownership in the 
Indian-listed Cairn India Limited. The deal initially started in August 2010, but delayed and 
then finally completed in December 2011 after obtaining all approvals from the concerned 
ministry and regulatory authorities. 
 
4. Analysis of sampling cases 
Case analysis is an important course in the case-study investigation across the 
interdisciplinary electives (Reddy, 2015a; Yin, 2003). We have discussed cases for various 
reasons that account for strategic motives of the deal, determinants of the transaction, and 
stock price reaction to the acquisition announcement. In particular, we have blended the 
extant cross-border M&As literature with case findings, and thereby improved the 
understanding and knowledge on international deals involving emerging markets. 
 
4.1 Analysis of Vodafone-Hutchison case 
Following the thick-description of the extant review and media texts, we analyze the case 
from two basic questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ in the given research environment. When 
alternative forms of foreign-investments are available, why did Vodafone intend to acquire 
Hutchison equity stake in CGP Investments as an entry into the Indian market. It does not 
simply a mean of the motives of acquisition, but it tries to look up what other strategic 
financial synergies were. 
 
(a) Strategic motives of acquisition: 
In the extant IB and strategic management literature, researchers have described the progress 
and potential of emerging markets and opportunities in it (e.g., Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000). In this vein, India is one of the Asian continental countries, which is a 
constituent of the emerging markets group. We agree that Indian market offers a great deal of 
market opportunities and invites MNCs to invest in the country for both economic progress 
and financial integration with the world economy. It is because of two important reasons, 
firstly the 1991 economic policy reforms, and secondly the contribution of the service sector 
to the economy, mostly information technology industry. In particular, the market that has 
significant potential and higher growth in the service sector is telecom business [when 
Vodafone planned to entry in India]. In this setting, a foreign MNC is allowed to invest in 
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India through direct investment (including acquisitions) or automatic investment route (a 
central bank’s permission is required). On the other hand, Vodafone is one of the fastest 
growing telecom companies in all European markets, which has considerable networks and 
alliances with other telecom companies. In fact, Hutchison Whampoa and Vodafone are the 
big players in this industry and both are ‘Flagship firms’ in which they usually co-ordinate 
both investment and operational activities of other companies within their business network 
(Whalley, 2004). Importantly, Vodafone has prior acquisition experience in the international 
telecom market. For instance, the takeover of German telecom Mannesmann by Vodafone in 
1999 also had faced serious issues relating to valuation of shares and premium. In fact, it 
“also became the subject of political debate and attempts at political intervention in 
Germany” (Halsall, 2008). Herewith, we reveal two findings: Vodafone aimed to offer 
services in all countries and to become a global giant in the telecom market. It entered India 
because of potential in the telecom market (Appendix 1). 
Moreover, Vodafone is technologically advanced MNC compared to domestic rivals 
include Bharti Airtel, Reliance, BSNL, Idea, etc. Conversely, Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
(HWL) almost retained their original investment and aimed to grasp the infrastructure 
projects (e.g., shipping) in the global market. With this, one might agree that HWL aimed to 
build their business value by making higher levels of investments in the global infrastructure 
projects. It infers that Vodafone wanted to enter the Indian market; at the same time, HWL 
also wanted to leave the market. Based on their previous alliance experience in the telecom 
business in European markets and following India’s border-crossing investment and taxation 
laws, Vodafone planned that acquiring HWL equity stake in CGP Investments likely to be a 
better option whilst saving corporate gain taxes on cash acquisition. Finally, it is understood 
that the motive of Vodafone acquisition was global diversification, increase market share by 
offering international services, gaining competitive advantage over domestic rivals, and enter 
other Asian markets through making Indian-entity as a wholly owned subsidiary. Altogether, 
Vodafone market value and brand value will improve significantly over the period. However, 
we argue that “saving or escaping capital gains tax” was not in any way the motive when we 
compare with the Vodafone’s previous acquisition of Mannesmann. One might infer that 
Vodafone achieved tax advantage due to their (or, their advisors) critical analysis of Indian 
overseas investment laws and their Indian-based legal advisors; of course, the chief executive 
officer, who is an Indian-origin. Further, Vodafone’s previous experience in overseas deal 
making truly helped the company officials while overcoming entry-mode barriers in 
developing countries and reaching the conclusion. We would support this streak to the 
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organizational learning theory: learning-by-doing and learning from prior acquisition 
experience (Collins, Holcomb, Certo, Hitt, & Lester, 2009; Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Waisman, 
2014; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009). For instance, Collins et al. (2009), and Meschi and 
Métais (2013) found that previous acquisition experience has a positive impact on overseas 
deal completion and such experience usually influenced by company’s overseas lookup/ 
establishment. Lastly, one would not agree with the construct of agency theory: managers 
exploit the shareholders' funds for their self-benefit, but not pragmatism. 
 
(b) Prospect views and comments: 
This section is an extension of the discussions presented in a published case paper (Reddy et 
al., 2014a, pp. 60-61). Hymer (1970, p. 447) argued that “MNCs, because of their size and 
international connections, have certain flexibility for escaping regulations imposed in one 
country”. In a recent study, Huizinga and Voget (2009) mentioned that international taxation 
has been a significant determinant in cross-border mergers like in Daimler of Germany with 
Chrysler of the US in 1998. They also cited that “the exemption from taxation by Germany of 
dividend income from abroad in contrast to the US system of worldwide taxation was one of 
the main reasons for locating the parent firm of Daimler-Chrysler in Germany” (pp. 1217-
1218). 
We provide a special acknowledgment to the Vodafone’s management and their 
patience during several rounds of proceedings at the state-level court and apex court. It is 
evidenced that Indian constitution and institutional laws are mostly old, not at par with other 
emerging markets; and of course, the problem is not related to the laws or regulations but it is 
highly related to the implementation of such rules and regulations in time that might due to 
political intervention and inefficient bureaucratic administration in many ministries including 
corporate affairs. As a case researcher in management, our argument is straightforward when 
the existing laws or book of law is inappropriate to justify or to judge the given case, then 
why should Vodafone pay the corporate gains tax. We argue that the actions or behavior of 
various ministries (e.g., department of revenue) has influenced or supported by politicking for 
seeking self-benefit from Vodafone in the form of bribe or corruption. Even it might be a 
case where a competitor or group of competitors influences the government to take advantage 
of the market capabilities if Vodafone continues to be litigated in the court. After many 
rounds of serious (strategic) arguments (explanations), Vodafone won the case, stating that it 
was not required to pay any more taxes to the government in light of the acquisition. By 
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contrast, Vodafone’s legal cost should be raised due to long-delay, proceedings and legal 
fees. 
On the other hand, Hutchison’s investment motive in India supports the Edgeworth 
box theory, where remitting profits are higher than the capital invested in the host country 
(Wang, Liu, & Zhang, 2007). In Whalley and Curwen (2012, p. 29), the authors argued that 
HTIL could have represented loss in 2007 when no sale of its 100% equity interest in CGP 
Investments to Vodafone. They also stated that HTIL has invested roughly US$2.6 billion in 
India since 1995. In this regard, one can estimate that Li Ka-shing has markedly gained about 
US$8.3 billion for the period of Hutchison presence in India during 1995‒2006 period (also 
cited in Reddy et al., 2014a). 
 
(c) Stock price reaction to the announcement: 
In the financial economics literature, researchers often examine stock returns around the 
merger or acquisition announcement using event study method (e.g., Brown & Warner, 1985; 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). Following this, we compute stock (Vodafone) and 
market (FTSE-100) returns around two incidents: deal announcement and after winning the 
case (Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2). We define the window period as ten days before and after the 
incident (-10, +10). Firstly, we understood that Vodafone has formally agreed to buy 
Hutchison equity stake on February 12, 2007. In the given Figure 1.1, it is noticed that 
Vodafone shareholders have received higher returns on the announcement day in which the 
stock gained by 1.34% than the previous day, but the market returns declined by 0.46%, and 
therefore, the abnormal returns were 1.80%. Surprisingly, the stock has shown negative 
returns before and after the announcement (0.83%, 0.83%) while market returns result in 
positive to be 0.57% and 0.45%. At the outset, one might argue that shareholders perceived 
the benefit of Vodafone’s acquisition strategy of entering the Asian emerging market-India. 
We argue that the Vodafone’s acquisition plan has created significant abnormal returns to 
their shareholders on the announcement. While observing the Figure 1.2, one suggests that 
winning the tax plea in the Indian jurisdiction has not influenced the stock on the day when 
Supreme Court given the judgment in favor of Vodafone (January 12, 2012). However, the 
stock has been crashed by 2.51% after the immediate announcement day, i.e. January 13, 
2012. For the reason that the decline in stock was not due to this reason, but might be the 
effect of other financial restructuring news. We understood that shareholders have received 
significant returns on the announcement day, but not on the day when Vodafone won the tax 
plea case in India. In sum, one can suggest that new information regarding company’s long-
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term strategic investments has influenced the stock, which supports the ‘moderate’ market 
efficiency. 
 
[Insert Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2] 
 
4.2 Analysis of Bharti Airtel-MTN deal 
As discussed in the method section, analysis is performed based on the published-case 
(Reddy et al., 2012). In addition, we have followed the case updates since the deal 
announcement and its appearance in the national media, particularly finance print media. 
Herewith, we understood that Bharti Airtel is a flagship telecom company of the Bharti 
Group based in India had been failing in twofold negotiations with South African based 
telecom market leader MTN, thus to create a cross-border merger, Bharti Airtel-MTN to do 
business in both the countries by making a compulsory norm that is dual listing. The analysis 
is responsible for various reasons such as strategic motives of the merger, reasons behind 
broken negotiations and stock reaction around the announcement. 
 
(a) Strategic motives of the cross-border merger: 
We analyze motives behind cross-country merger from the view of two organizations. On one 
hand, Bharti Airtel was the market leader in the Indian telecom market, which had significant 
market share and market value. In fact, the company has some experience in making 
domestic deal's success while having deep pockets. Moreover, it was one of the recognized 
business groups in India, controlled by family-ownership. The top-level management has 
aimed to put the Bharti Airtel as one of the leading telecom company in the world’s league 
cum ranking by internationalizing their operations in low-end markets like Africa, South Asia 
and Middle East countries. We believe that the management of the Bharti Airtel has chosen 
“acquisition strategy” as a better option compared to greenfield strategy. It is evidenced that 
acquisitions create higher value to the shareholders than other foreign market entry-mode 
choices. One might raise a question regarding market selection: why did the company choose 
Africa as a potential investment. After observing the saturation in developed markets, many 
US- and UK-based multinationals have aimed to grasp the market in low-end or developing 
markets. Thus, South Africa is one of the constituent in the emerging economies group, 
which is a growing market and invites potential players in the business. Indeed, India has 
good associations with South Africa since the independence of the country. We argue that 
Bharti Airtel has chosen African market due to pertinent business opportunities in the 
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telecom market, and hoping Africans would respond positively to the company services after 
the merger. Conversely, MTN Group was largely controlled by government ownership, and 
its administration influenced by western management theories and practices. In fact, the 
company offers services across the markets at par with international competitors like 
Vodafone, AT&T, Hutchison, etc. It is found that MTN Group was a much bigger company 
than Bharti Airtel in terms of revenues was but market capitalization was lower. MTN has 
aimed to expand globally by choosing ‘acquisition option’ as one the value creation strategy 
among other foreign market-entry modes, and their decision ‘to merge with Bharti Airtel’ 
was largely influenced by the previous- and ongoing-economic relation between two 
countries. 
In addition, we have discussed few synergies of the transaction (if the deal could have 
been completed in second-innings.) The synergies include financial, marketing, operational 
and technological aspects. Firstly, the new dual-listing entity “Bharti Airtel-MTN” in India 
and “MTN-Bharti Airtel” in South Africa would improve the business value in terms of 
revenues, market capitalization and profits. The deal would have created higher value or 
abnormal returns to the shareholders of both companies around the merger announcement. It 
would have focused on new markets in South Asia and Middle East through greenfield and 
acquisition modes. As a result, the cost of services will go down due to market integration 
that leads at improving cost-leadership, which also enhances the average revenue per user. 
Regarding the market, the new entity would grasp higher market share both by integrating 
various international services and by offering services in other markets. It would have 
supported by the advanced technological features and operational strategies. Both 
technologies and operational strategies influence the customer service, customer satisfaction, 
customer retention, cost reduction and brand reputation. In sum, the combined- ownership, 
administration and expertise would focus on network and service quality that led to build a 
global giant in the telecom business. 
 
(b) Reasons behind the unsuccessful cross-border merger: 
Based on the rich reading to cross-border M&As, we understood that internal factors (firm- 
and deal-specific) and external factors determine the cross-border deal success or failure. We 
have presented our systemic case analysis by tying the connection between extant literature 
and case description. The reasons behind the unsuccessful cross-border merger include firm-
specific factors (status of the company, ownership structure and previous acquisition 
experience), deal-specific factors (deal structure, deal type, payment mode, advisors to the 
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deal and their experience), and external factors (institutional issues, political issues, legal 
issues, and socio-cultural differences) (Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Firm-specific determinants 
Bharti Airtel incorporated as an Indian company and listed on the country’s leading stock 
exchanges. The company does not offer any services outside the country in the given telecom 
business, and does not have an international outlook (prior to this deal). MTN Group 
incorporated as a South African company, which has an international outlook due to its 
widespread services and operations in the African region and technology integration. We 
argue a firm that has some international experience can actively participate in overseas deals 
without making further delays compared to average deal making time. Bharti Airtel (MNT 
Group) was largely controlled by family-owned (government-owned). We suspect that 
ownership structure also played a key role in making deal unsuccessful. For the reason that, 
after the merger ownership in the dual listing firm will be in different form compared to the 
previous status as it was in unmerged firm and this issue will lead to create agency conflicts 
(e.g., Indian managers vs. South African owners, South African managers vs. Indian owners) 
in both the countries. Importantly, Bharti Airtel does not have any international deal making 
or acquisition experience but it has few acquisition experiences in domestic deals featuring 
lower bids. MTN has an international outlook but it does not hold significant acquisition 
experience. We therefore agree with the extant researchers’ evidences that previous 
acquisition experience in overseas deal making has a positive impact on deal completion 
(Collins et al., 2009; Francis et al., 2014; Meschi & Métais, 2013). For instance, Collins et al. 
(2009) found that prior experience with international acquisitions is more predictive of 
subsequent overseas acquisitions than prior domestic acquisition experience. Zhu (2011) 
suggested that overseas deals require more sophisticated and advanced managerial skills and 
expertise to control the firm internationalization process. Further, acquiring firm’s economic 
value, availability of free cash flows and market potential stimulate to engage in overseas 
acquisitions (Gonzalez, Vasconcellos, Kish, & Kramer, 1997). Albeit, it is not our primary 
objective of the research to evaluate the financial performance but after reviewing their 
previous annual reports, we found that both companies have sufficient cash reserves and good 
financial indicators. In addition, the relevant factors could be managers who participated in 
two negotiation innings and their skills and expertise in deal making. 
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Deal-specific determinants 
Previous researchers found that deal characteristics also determine the deal completion or 
incompletion. We found few studies that examine deal-specific factors influencing 
announcement returns but not studies that investigate the status of deal, negotiation process or 
merger process. In the review article, Haleblian et al. (2009) mentioned that deal success not 
only depends upon firm-specific factors like size, financial performance and acquirer 
experience but also influences by deal-specific factors like payment method and deal type. 
We therefore discuss the given case by linking various deal characteristics such as deal 
structure, deal type, payment mode and advisors to the deal and their experience. Firstly, 
Bharti Airtel-MTN deal structure was largely confused and dominated by the “importance of 
ownership rights” that created an institutional dichotomy “dual listing”. As a result, payment 
method has been determined both by stock transfer and by cash payment, together estimated 
the deal value over US$23 billion. We do not agree that M&A advisors have really shown 
their expertise in deal completion or building cross-border deal structure. As mentioned in the 
case, Standard Chartered and Barclays advised Bharti Airtel, while Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch and Deutsche Bank advised the MTN Group. It is fact that all advisory firms have 
excellent international expertise and experience in overseas deals ranging from private equity 
to joint ventures and acquisitions. They are highly reputed advisors operate internationally 
have expertise in deal making that responsible for developed markets (Lowinski, Schiereck, 
& Thomas, 2004). However, advisory firms do not have previous experience in deal making 
with developing economics or emerging markets like India, China and South Africa. 
Herewith, one might comment lack of experience in deal making, which linking emerging 
markets adversely affect the deal success. Further, it is clemency to put a comment on two-
negotiation innings where advisors did not perform well even in the second innings after 
knowing their mistakes in the first innings. In sum, we argue that deal-specific factors play an 
important role in cross-border merger or acquisition completion. Therefore, managers of 
acquirer and target firms, and M&A advisory firms should learn how to make deals 
successful in emerging countries. 
 
External factors 
Previous studies have examined the determinants of cross-border M&As in different 
economic settings found that country-specific factors such as economic and financial market 
indicators, institutional characteristics, political factors (including corruption), accounting, 
valuation and taxation laws, geographical factors and cultural factors determine the foreign 
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deal success or failure (e.g., Akhigbe, Madura, & Spencer, 2003; Alguacil et al., 2011; di 
Giovanni, 2005; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Pablo, 2009; Reis et al., 2013; 
Serdar Dinc & Erel 2013; Zhang et al., 2011). For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004), Bris 
and Cabolis (2008), and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggested that acquisition 
transactions were high in countries with better accounting standards and stronger investor 
protection. In addition, we also observe few cases connected with emerging markets group, 
and thereby argue that firm- and deal-specific factors do not affect all announced deals, but 
county-specific determinants affect all kinds of inbound and outbound deals, especially pre-
completion phase of the M&A deal. It infers that owners and managers should give more 
priority to institutional characteristics to make deals successful than other negotiation factors 
like deal structure, payment matters and due diligence. 
In the given case, Bharti Airtel-MTN cross-country M&A deal had broken because of 
two country-specific determinants: institutional factors including laws and regulations related 
to M&As, and political factors including bureaucratic administration. Firstly, every country 
defines their own institutional rules and regulations relating to domestic and foreign 
inbound/outbound investments. It is fact that host country governments usually restrict 
foreign inbound investment to protect domestic owners and to control the market prices (e.g., 
Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). At the same time, a country like India does not 
update or improve the institutional regulations due to political pressure and lack of expertise 
in policy strategies. Then, this kind of dichotomous behavior adversely affects inbound deals 
and thereby escaping such restrictions domestic multinationals make outbound investments. 
In Witt and Lewin (2007), the authors argued that local firms invest in other countries as an 
escape response to home country institutional constraints. Of course, Bharti Airtel followed 
the same strategy where it acquired Zain Telecom after negotiations broken with MTN. The 
key institutional dichotomous law is “dual listing”. (dual listing is a process by which a 
company would be allowed to list and trade on the stock exchanges in two different 
countries.) This decision obviously influences the ownership structure of the combined entity. 
Deal structure has also faced serious contemplations including stock transfer in the form of 
global depository/American depository receipts and cash payment. Many countries do not 
allow companies to list on two different country stock exchanges. Albeit, to the best of our 
knowledge, US government allows such deals due to its developed financial markets in terms 
of size, technology and control mechanisms. To overcome this dichotomy, Bharti Airtel or 
MTN could have materialized the deal either by making strategic joint venture or by creating 
wholly owned subsidiary through greenfield entry.  
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Lastly, we would comment on political factors associated with the deal process. We 
outline that the case was announced first time on May 6, 2008, then called-off the deal after 
19 days, i.e. May 25. Thereafter, they re-participated in the second innings on May 26, 2009, 
extended until August … to September, and then finally departed the deal on September 30 
without making further attempts. Apart from the case writing experience, we interpreted 
everyday news around the merger announcement and were eager to know the status of 
negotiations. The deal has been cancelled not only due to institutional regime, but also due to 
political and bureaucratic administration including various government officials and 
ministries like telecom, competition controller and stock market regulator. It is suggested that 
host country political and institutional environment determines the success of cross-border 
takeovers (Zhang et al., 2011). For instance, Wan and Wong (2009) highlighted that the 
proposed deal between CNOOC's of China and Unocal of US became unsuccessful due to 
political barriers. 
Some researchers might argue that the proposed deal had broken because of cultural 
factors between two countries (e.g., Geppert et al., 2013; Hitt et al., 2006; Reus, 2012). 
Albeit, we agree that there is significant difference in culture and habits between two 
countries; but this may not be a strong reason, because the deal should have been broken in 
the first meeting if culture is the main issue. In a recent study, Serdar Dinc and Erel (2013) 
argued that “nationalism in mergers is more likely to be motivated by sociological and 
political reasons than economic ones”. Therefore, host country regulations, policies, foreign 
relations between home and country countries and progress of the host country’s economy 
are extremely essential for acquiring firm managers in successfully conducting overseas deals 
in emerging markets like India and China (e.g., Zhang & He, 2014). In addition, host country 
corruption is directly proportionate that adversely affects cross-border inward capital flows 
when coming from developed to developing economies (e.g., Barbopoulos, Marshall, 
MacInnes, & McColgan, 2014). We also argue that the deal has collapsed due to 
operationalization of the equality principle (Meyer & Altenborg, 2007), and due to lack of 
careful evaluation of due diligence issues such as financial and organizational factors 
(Epstein, 2005). It is appealing to counterpoint that Bharti Airtel-MTN deal was broken as 
similar to the deal between two Scandinavian telecom companies, Telia of Sweden and 
Telenor of Norway in 2001 (Meyer & Altenborg, 2007, 2008). Likewise, the acquisition of 
German telecom company Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000 and British subsidiary Rover 
by German automobile firm BMW in the same year were being resulted “not just as business 
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disputes …, but as part of a wider conflict between different models of capitalism that 
responsible for two countries” (Halsall, 2008). 
 
(c) Stock price reaction to the announcement: 
We have computed stock returns around the announcement that refers to three incidents: first 
innings, second innings and deal cancellation (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3). We 
examined stock (Bharti Airtel) and market (NSE: CNX Nifty) returns during the event widow 
that is ten days before and after the announcement (-10, +10). From the Figure 3.1, one can 
perceive that Bharti Airtel and MTN have started negotiations first time on May 6, 2008. 
However, the stock has crashed by 5.32% on the announcement day, which was higher than 
the decline in market returns 0.92%. Importantly, the stock has shown negative returns on the 
day before and after the announcement (0.70%, 3.57%), but the stock price rose by 1.60% 
and 1.52% on second and third day after the announcement. We understood that Bharti Airtel 
shareholders were not happy to perceive the strategy of merging with South African based 
MTN Group. Thereafter, when both companies have restarted their negotiations (May 26, 
2009) for possible deal making, then Bharti Airtel stock again crashed by 4.83% on the 
announcement day, which is higher than the decline in market returns 2.85% (Figure 3.2). It 
infers that shareholders were not content to accept the offer or decision taken by the board, 
which postulates the agency theory: manager’s individual decisions at the expense of 
shareholders funds. Finally, when the deal collapsed on September 30, 2009, Bharti Airtel 
stock has raised by 3.90% on October 1, 2009, which was the day after the announcement, 
while market returns have slightly declined by 0.01% (Figure 3.3). It assumes that 
shareholders have benefited on the day immediate to the announcement regarding 
‘negotiations called-off’ and their returns were more than the market returns. Herewith, we 
believe that both companies might have decided to call-off the deal after the market closing 
on September 30, but it has resulted in October 1. One may argue that new information 
regarding the firm’s long-term strategic investments has influenced the stock, which supports 
the ‘strong’ market efficiency. 
The broken cross-country Bharti-MTN deal shall become evident for budding 
entrepreneurs and rising executives and managers, who are interested to partake in M&A, 
joint ventures, takeovers and strategic alliances. Moreover, the deal became complex due to 
non-availability of ready reckon of regulatory provisions on takeover code, open offer issues 
and dual listing in India. 
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[Insert Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3] 
 
4.3 Analysis of Vedanta-Cairn India deal 
Organizations such as developed and emerging country MNCs participating in cross-border 
M&A, takeovers, joint ventures and alliances should pay more attention to due diligence:  
pre-emptive rights, contracts, contingent issues, and country-specific issues: institutional 
norms and political and government involvement, together badly affect the deal. With this 
intuitive note, the case suggested that there is no connotation of excellent or awful 
negotiations, though those will affect the deal conclusion. A possible merger depends upon 
the belief and willingness of both the entities that would make the deal successful or 
unsuccessful. At the outset, we argue that Vedanta-Cairn India deal has been delayed (later, 
completed) due to institutional regime relating to open offers and ownership choice, political 
factors and bureaucratic erratic behavior, and due diligence issues. Captivating this, we 
presented the case analysis in different streaks include strategic motives of the acquisition 
and the reasons behind the delayed deal. Prior to look into the case analysis, it is our primary 
guideline in which we have analyzed the case based on published case (Nangia et al., 2011), 
direct observations through media texts around the announcement and extant literature on 
cross-border acquisitions. 
 
(a) Strategic motives of acquisition: 
The key motives of conglomerate acquisition include business diversification, location 
experience, new market opportunities and overall business value (Figure 4). 
 
Business diversification 
The prime motive of Vedanta’s acquisition of Cairn Energy stake in Cairn India is 
conglomerate diversification, then to create a leading international group in the businesses of 
core sectors like mining, aluminium, iron ore and oil. Of course, acquisition strategy is the 
most common means of implementing diversification (Pablo, 2013). Given that Vedanta is 
new to the business of oil and exploration, thus it has to think about implementing the 
footsteps in the Indian oil trade. Cairn energy has an interest in exploration rather refining 
and marketing of that oil/gas. In this setting, Vedanta will make a new plan and design proper 
implementation program to add success to its twenty years of growth. As highlighted in the 
press that “the acquisition enhances Vedanta’s position as a natural resources leader in India. 
Cairn India’s Rajasthan asset is a world-class infrastructure in terms of scale and cost, 
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delivering strong and growing cash flow.” Vedanta can achieve its goal becoming the world’s 
third largest diversified miner after BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. The acquisition would also 
position Vedanta as a major oil player in Asia. We believe that Vedanta will meet their 
mission statement “to be a world class metals and mining group and generate superior 
financial returns” over the period. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Location experience 
In the given case, Vedanta Group is an Indian-origin business entity where it operates 
business transactions from its headquarters in London, UK, which has businesses in iron ore, 
aluminium and zinc. Due to this reason (Shimizu et al., 2004), we have treated the deal as an 
overseas acquisition. Besides heavy restrictions and higher level of control by government oil 
companies, Vedanta will move forward due to their previous and ongoing experience in 
India. 
 
New market opportunities 
It is also a fact that the acquiring firm (Vedanta) will gain a new business advantage by 
acquiring Cairn India that is oil business. In other words, it is an unrelated business segment 
in the existing portfolio of Vedanta Group. Herewith, we argue that conglomerate 
diversification through acquisition will create new product or business opportunities but it 
does not gain competitive advantage using their existing managerial skills and expertise. In 
such cases, conglomerate diversification strategy creates new agency problems besides 
existing issues in the diversified business group (e.g., Erdorf, Hartmann-Wendels, Heinrichs, 
& Matz, 2013). 
 
Business value 
By acquiring Cairn Energy’s stake in Cairn India, Vedanta Group business value will 
substantially improve in terms of market capitalization and overall firm value [revenue]. It is 
because of two reasons, first acquiring firm owns significant ownership interest in the target 
firm, and secondly, that ownership rights will add value to the whole group business value 
[incremental growth in revenue]. In the literature, few scholars have argued that 
conglomerate diversification creates (destroys) firm value (e.g., Martin & Sayrak, 2003). In a 
recent review, Erdorf et al. (2013) suggested that concentric (related) diversification 
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improves market value than that of the increase in the conglomerate (unrelated) 
diversification. So far, Vedanta business value has grown up due to their expertise in 
acquisitions: deal making, integration and management. It will happen in the long run due to 
its nature of business that is oil exploration in India, which is largely controlled by public-
sector enterprises like Indian Oil Corporation, ONGC, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, etc. 
In addition, it is not our purpose to examine the case from the lens of negativity, but 
we largely explore the case based on existing literature. The negativity of the merger includes 
Vedanta has no experience in the oil business, erratic laws related to the oil industry in India 
(e.g., inconsistency in oil prices), higher control of government authority, and political 
pressure, international oil prices effect, need heavy investment in the oil business and the 
opportunity [cost] lacking in other investments. We argue that Vedanta will create value by 
integrating the resources such as people, markets and technologies, and others like board 
structure, technical staff, capabilities and core competencies of Cairn India. As, Vedanta is 
new to the field of oil exploration business; therefore, it should appoint efficient managers to 
look after the new business and to improve business value. There were failures in 
‘diversification through acquisition’ in the past, but Vedanta so far assembled its businesses 
in various geographical networks through acquisition method. Finally, we propose that 
Vedanta has better prospects in the oil exploration business in India that will enhance overall 
business value if they had better use of location advantages, prior diversified experience, 
international outlook and internalization among its subsidiaries in India and overseas. 
 
(b) Reasons behind the delayed deal: 
We outline various reasons behind the delayed deal that responsible for organizational 
factors, deal characteristics, due diligence and country-specific determinants (Figure 5). 
 
Organizational factors 
In the given case, one may find that Vedanta Group is one of the largest business groups in 
India, which operates businesses in aluminium, iron ore, copper and zinc. Whereas, the 
company is a registered UK firm and manages from its headquarters at London. It has 
significant experience in minerals trading as well as in converting loss making into a profit-
making business. In particular, both Vedanta and Cairn Energy have sophisticated previous 
acquisition experience in India. For example, Vedanta acquired Sesa Goa, an iron ore 
business among other contested bidders like Mittal Steels and Aditya Birla Group. 
Importantly, Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) has shown 400% rise in production capacity in 
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seven years of post-acquisition under the control of Vedanta Group. We strongly argue that 
the company has stylish experience both in business making and in deal contesting. During 
the deal announcement, few government officials raised questions relating to relevant field 
experience and other ownership issues. Albeit, Vedanta will manage new business using their 
intellectual knowledge, skills and expertise. In sum, we understood that lack of relevant 
business experience also influence the deal completion. 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Deal characteristics 
In the field-based study, Epstein (2005) suggested that acquiring firm managers should pay 
attention to two aspects of the deal structure, namely price premium and payment mode. As 
such, the case background, we did not find any deal-specific factor that caused the deal delay 
or unsuccessful within the average deal completion time. We deeply examine the deal 
structure, and then drawn few interesting observations. The deal had not been attracted by 
counter-bids either from domestic or from international owners. It infers that Vedanta was the 
only bidder keen to grasp the new business opportunity by acquiring Cairn Energy’s stake in 
Cairn India. Following the Section 20(8) of the SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations-1997, Vedanta 
has paid a non-compete fee, a sum of Rs. 50 per equity share to Cairn Energy for not to 
operate the same business in India, Sri Lanka and Bhutan over next three years (2011-2013). 
Further, Vedanta and Cairn Energy have agreed to break fee arrangement; “will pay an 
amount equal to 1% of the market capitalization of Cairn Energy on the last trading day prior 
to the deal announcement”. The deal structure was meaningful and developed by professional 
M&A advisors but both open offers program and payment structure were a bit confused. 
Herewith, we understood that either domestic or international firm acquiring more than 20% 
equity stake in the Indian-listed entity should buy shares from the public through open offers, 
above than the threshold limit as prescribed in the SEBI Takeover Code, 1997. We do not 
comment on the open offer program that is governed by SEBI to protect small and medium 
shareholder's ownership interest. Because of open offers program, Vedanta developed a 
strategic plan thorough its Indian subsidiary firms, THL Aluminium Ltd and Sesa Goa 
Limited, and JM Financial was the lead manager made the public announcement. In fact, 
payment structure has diluted, faced many issues at SEBI, RBI and other government bodies 
including tax authorities. Regarding payment, we found that Vedanta has paid the deal 
amount to Cairn Energy largely through long-term bank loans. Finally, Vedanta Resources 
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hold 58.5% (direct and indirect) ownership interest for US$8.67 billion after passing 
16monhs of public announcement. In sum, we argue that except open offers program (and, 
royalty payments), other deal characteristics like the type of deal, payment type, non-compete 
fee, break fee and advisory role did not influence the deal completion. 
 
Due diligence 
In the extant literature on international deal making, scholars have argued that due diligence 
should be conducted by professionals to ascertain the true business value of the target firm, 
and to know the business issues and other contingent issues attached to the deal. In the given 
case, we found due diligence issues include pre-emptive rights, production sharing contracts, 
royalty payment and information transparency. Firstly, ONGC, which is a public-sector 
enterprise, has 30% ownership interest in the Rajasthan oil field where in it attracted pre-
emptive rights or right of first refusal. However, ONGC’s pre-emption did not affect the deal 
completion. Secondly, Cairn Energy has fulfilled more than 10 clearances from the 
petroleum-ministry due to ownership interest in Cairn India through its subsidiaries in 
Australia, Mauritius, British Virgin Islands, Singapore, UK and the Netherlands. Thirdly, 
ONGC had raised an issue on royalty payment but Cairn Energy’s founder said neither Cairn 
nor Vedanta has any role in the royalty issue and there is no subject of us paying any amount 
of royalty. Lastly, Cairn Energy also cleared other transparency issues relating to acquirer 
profile, previous experience and financial progress, which was an issue with ONGC. While, 
some media statements described that the deal has delayed due to royalty payments 
disagreement among Cairn Energy, ONGC and Petroleum Ministry (e.g., Business Line, 
2011). We thus suggest that acquiring firm managers and M&A advisors should also pay 
attention to the due diligence program of the target firm (e.g., Angwin, 2001). In some 
instances, white collar crimes become a serious considering factor in due diligence and 
sovereign related compliances (Byington & McGee, 2010). 
 
Country-specific determinants 
Existing studies on cross-border M&As provided the evidence that deals completion not only 
influenced by organizational- and deal-specific determinants, but also influenced by country-
specific determinants like economic indicators, institutional laws, political factors and 
cultural issues. At the outset, we argue that economic and cultural determinants between two 
countries have no impact on the Vedanta-Cairn India deal. Nevertheless, we found two 
important issues, namely erratic behavior of institutional bodies and political intervention. A 
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few government ministries and associated politicians have tried to take the advantage of the 
deal but they rather failed to perceive benefits like a bribe. Because of politicians’ 
unhappiness, they insisted regulatory bodies to behave unfriendly that made the deal delay. 
Of course, Vedanta’s founder met government officials responsible for the Ministry of 
Petroleum, Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Office and President of the ruling political 
party. Following this, regulatory bodies such as SEBI and other departments have represented 
their erratic behavior and thereby delayed the government approvals when Cairn Energy 
approached them. We suggest that this streak supports the theory of liability of foreignness 
(Denk, Kaufmann, & Roesch, 2012; Zaheer, 1995). Albeit, Vedanta and Cairn Energy have 
set the deadline April 15, 2011, but it delayed, then finally completed in December, 2011. 
While supporting our argument, we accept the findings of previous studies that host country’s 
political environment, institutional and regulatory framework and behavior of sovereign 
departments significantly affect the international acquisition completion. For instance, Wang 
et al. (2007) suggested that host country governments often protect foreign deals due to 
national economic security. Specifically, political influence found to be more in deals when 
state-owned enterprises become targets or when the industry is largely controlled by 
government enterprises irrespective of the target firm ownership structure (Zhang et al., 
2011). They also suggested that “political concerns and perceived national security threats 
can lead national review agencies to quash deals in the name of national security or to protect 
local champion” (p. 228). In sum, the quality of governance framework - political, economic, 
social, institutional and cultural environment affect international inward acquisitions. 
 
(c) Stock price reaction around the announcement: 
The study exclusively evidences the reaction of stocks of all connected parties around 
acquisition announcement and compares with market performance. Based on the event study 
method, we examine stock returns for acquiring firm (Vedanta Resources), target ownership 
(Cairn Energy), target firm (Cairn India), and market index (FTSE-100, NSE CNX Nifty) 
(Figure 6). The announcement date was August 16, 2010. The stock and market returns are 
examined during the event window, i.e. ten days before and after the announcement (-10, 
+10). Interestingly, we found that both Vedanta and Cairn Energy shareholders have 
benefited by significantly higher returns on the announcement day (4.87%, 5.32%) compared 
to market returns (0.01%). While, Cairn India stock price has crashed by 6.36% on the 
announcement day and this decline was notably higher than the market returns to be negative, 
0.62%. Hence, both Cairn Energy and Cairn India stock returns found to be positive for two 
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days before the announcement, then Cairn Energy stock returns declined after the 
announcement. Whereas, Vedanta stock returns found to be negative before the 
announcement day. In particular, both Vedanta and Cairn India stock returns gained by 
3.11% and 1.67% respectively after the immediate announcement day (+1), while Cairn 
Energy stock found to be declined by 1.38%. From these findings, we infer that Vedanta and 
Cairn Energy shareholders were positively reacted to the acquisition. It means Cairn Energy 
shareholders received a better valuation to their stock, whilst Vedanta shareholders perceived 
that business value would improve through the acquisition made in India because of location 
experience, previous acquisition-integration experience and ongoing business practice in the 
country. This streak positively associated with the existing studies. By contrast, Cairn India 
stock found to be negative on the announcement day, which infers that shareholders 
perceived that Vedanta does not have experience in the oil business, which will adversely 
affect the business value in the future. Based on the inferences, we argue that acquisition 
information positively received by Vedanta and Cairn Energy shareholders, while Cairn India 
shareholders found to be disagreeing. These findings support the market efficiency theory 
(semi-strong/moderate) where market reacts to the new information relating to long-term 
business restricting events like mergers, acquisitions joint ventures and takeovers. 
 
[Insert Figure 6] 
 
5. Cross-case analysis of sampling cases 
In multi-case research design, cross-case analysis is one of the most important tasks that 
aimed at presenting various case issues across cases, which enhances the understanding and 
research learning (Table 1). The cross-case analysis presents discussions for various reasons 
such as (a) characteristics of the acquiring and target firms, (b) typical attributes of the deal, 
(c) determinants of the deal (firm-, deal-, and country-specific attributes), (d) stock 
performance around acquisition announcement, (e) understanding and learning, and (f) 
implications for host country and multinational managers. Furthermore, we also outline 
common findings across cases for diverse causes accountable for firm-, deal-, and country-
specific determinants. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
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6. Concluding remarks 
6.1 Implications of mergers and acquisitions for extractive industries 
We found very few studies that examine acquisition concept in the extractive industries 
include oil and gas exploration, gold mining and iron ore (Ericsson, 1999; Lundmark & 
Nilsson, 2003; Ng & Donker, 2013; Schmitz & Teixeira, 2008; Wårell, 2007; Wårell & 
Lundmark, 2008; Weston, Johnson, & Siu, 1999). For instance, Weston et al. (1999) 
described that technological change, globalization and freer trade, privatization and 
deregulation, industry instability, pressures for economies of scale, scope, and 
complementarities, and rising stock prices, low interest rates, strong economic growth have 
multiplied the forms and sources of competition in the industries, especially oil business (pp. 
150-151). In particular, we propose that the market for acquisitions in dynamic industries has 
markedly increased all over the world due to cost advantages from merged firm, better 
integration of operational activities and internalization of markets. Extant research indicated 
that firms participating in horizontal integration have seen a positive impact on overall firm 
value, while firms entering unrelated business through acquisition mode have seen a negative 
impact. Albeit, research also suggested that the welfare measures in the oil and iron ore 
industries has adversely affected by mergers including horizontal modes, which is a 
contrasting result when compared to the expectations at the time of the merger (Wårell, 2007; 
Wårell & Lundmark, 2008). Overall, mergers and privatization of sovereign companies in 
extractive industries not only have a positive impact on firm value but also improve 
productivity of the target firm (Schmitz & Teixeira, 2008). However, acquiring firms must 
not decline the interest in promoting community relationships and improving welfare 
measures at both employee and society level (Dupuy, 2014; Eklund, 2014).  
On one hand, emerging markets that characterize strict regulatory norms relating to 
mergers and inward investment in extractive industries should deregulate for aspiring better 
economic prospects include job creation and income generation. In a recent study, Hunter 
(2014) suggested that objective-based or principal-based regulation is an efficient method of 
regulating oil business, because it reduces both regulator burden and social costs when 
compared to rule-based system. On the other hand, multinational enterprises aiming to enter 
in emerging markets must have clarity on legal framework relating to investment proposals, 
tariff barriers, tax schemes, industry competition, and more importantly the role of state-
owned enterprises. In addition, they should be cautious when entering in countries like India 
due to the high-level of government and political intervention particularly in overseas 
investment proposals that focus on natural resources industry. Herewith, we suggest that 
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bilateral trade relations, institutional environment, the political situation and cultural 
attributes have serious effects on direct international investments through either greenfield or 
acquisition method. 
 
6.2 Conclusions  
This paper has aimed to analyze three litigated cross-border inbound acquisitions in India 
using qualitative case study method. It performed both individual case analysis and cross-
case analysis to explore critical findings, which would benefit not only researchers in 
management but also help multinational managers participating in overseas deals particularly 
refer to dynamic industries like oil and gas exploration, mining, telecom and automobile. We 
therefore recapitulate that (i) Vodafone-Hutchison deal has been long-time delayed in light of 
legal dispute defining international taxation due to weak institutional environment in which 
the deal has no nexus with Indian territory that does not allow government to levy capital 
gains tax on the deal amount; (ii) Bharti Airtel-MTN deal has become unsuccessful even in 
the second innings of discussions due to weak financial market laws [cross-listing], 
government and political intervention, and somewhat culture distance between India and 
South Africa; and (iii) Vedanta-Cairn India deal has delayed, but later completed after 16 
months of government approval in which the transaction has attracted both due diligence 
issues [royalty payments) and government interference. We thus propose that sampling cases 
have strikingly affected by host country-specific attributes such as financial market 
regulations, political environment, government intervention and its erratic behavior, and 
cultural distance.  
Yet, the study carried out within the limitations that remain to use of secondary data 
sources. Taking forward, we suggest that research on foreign deals characterizing delay, fail, 
litigation, tax dispute, government intervention, political influence, white collar issues in due 
diligence, higher valuation, counter bids and integration problems would add significant 
contribution and new knowledge to the cross-border M&As stream. In particular, a cross-
disciplinary study among developed and emerging markets, between dynamic industries 
deserves further exploration for assorted foreign investment policies.         
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Fig. 1.1 Vodafone stock returns around acquisition announcement 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 Vodafone stock returns around the incident (win over the tax plea in India) 
(source: Authors plot the graphs based on data analysis) 
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Fig. 2 Reasons behind the unsuccessful Bharti Airtel-MTN deal 
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Fig. 3.1 Bharti Airtel stock returns around the announcement (first innings) 
 
Fig. 3.2 Bharti Airtel stock returns around the announcement (second innings) 
 
Fig. 3.3 Bharti Airtel stock returns around the announcement (unsuccessful)  
(source: Authors plot the graphs based on data analysis)
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Fig. 4 Strategic motives of Vedanta acquisition of Cairn India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Reasons behind the delayed deal between Vedanta and Cairn India 
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Fig. 6 Stock returns for Vedanta, Cairn Energy and Cairn India around announcement  
(source: Authors plot the graph based on data analysis) 
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Table 1. Cross-case analysis of sampling cases 
Determinant Description Vodafone-Hutchison deal Bharti Airtel-MTN deal Vedanta-Cairn India deal 
A.  Characteristics of the acquiring and target firms 
Definition of the deal Successful, delayed and  then 
completed, or broken 
Completed, but legally challenged 
(tax plea) 
unsuccessful cross-border 
negotiations 
Delayed, but later completed 
Type of the deal Cross-border inbound (outbound) 
acquisition  
Inbound Inbound and outbound Inbound 
Classification of the 
deal 
Mergers, acquisition, or takeover Acquisition Merger Acquisition 
Continental/region of 
the acquirer 
It refers to the geography of the 
participating party 
Europe Africa and Asia Europe 
Target It refers to the geography of the 
participating party 
Asia Asia and Africa Asia 
Title of the acquirer  Registered name of the firm Vodafone Group Plc MTN Group Limited and Bharti 
Airtel Ltd 
Vedanta Resources Plc 
Target Registered name of the firm Hutchison Essar Ltd through 
acquiring CGP Investment share 
Bharti Airtel Ltd and MTN 
Group Limited  
Cairn India Ltd through 
acquiring Cairn Energy Plc 
Business profile of the 
acquirer  
Nature of the business operations  Telecommunications Diversified business group and 
Telecommunications 
Diversified business group 
Target Nature of the business operations Diversified business group Telecommunications and 
Diversified business group 
Oil exploration 
H.Q/country of  the 
acquirer 
Registered headquarters of the 
firm 
London/United Kingdom Johannesburg/South Africa and 
New Delhi/India  
London/United Kingdom 
Target Registered headquarters of the 
firm 
Mumbai/India New Delhi/India and 
Johannesburg/South Africa  
Gurgaon/India 
Establishment of 
acquirer  
Year of establishment 1982 1994 and 1995 1976 (Indian origin) 
Target Year of establishment Prior to 2000 1995 and 1994 2007 
Ownership pattern of 
acquirer  
Publicly listed firm, private 
limited firm, public sector 
Publicly listed firm Publicly listed firm Publicly listed firm 
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undertaking, or subsidiary firm  
Target Publicly listed firm, private 
limited firm, public sector 
undertaking, or subsidiary firm 
Subsidiary firm Publicly listed firm Publicly listed firm 
Status of acquirer Local company or 
internationalized company 
International outlook International outlook and 
National outlook 
International outlook 
Target Local company or 
internationalized company 
International outlook National outlook and 
International outlook 
International outlook 
Prior acquisition 
experience of acquirer 
It refers to the prior experience in 
deal making at international 
settings. 
Yes 
For instance, Vodafone has 
acquired Mannesmann AG, 
German telecom company in 
2000. 
Bharti Airtel has prior 
acquisition experience in 
domestic deals, for example, in 
2001 it has acquired Spice 
Telecom operations in Kolkata, 
and majority stake in SkyCell. 
Yes 
For instance, In 2007, Vedanta 
acquired 51% controlling 
stake in Sesa Goa Limited, the 
India’s largest producer and 
exporter of iron ore company. 
Target It refers to the prior experience in 
deal making at international 
settings. 
Yes  
For example, HWL has indirect 
control in the Indian-joint venture 
Hutchison-Essar Limited through 
holding controlling interest in 
HTIL.  
- - 
B. Typical attributes of the deal 
Number of rounds Continuation of the deal refers to 
1, other wise 2.  
1 2 1 
Start date When negotiations were initiated February 11, 2007 (Dec 23, 2006: 
first appeared in media) 
May 6, 2008 August 16, 2010 
Closing date When negotiations or deal was 
completed 
May 8, 2007 September 30, 2009 December 8, 2011 
Deal announcement  The formal announcement of the 
deal by acquiring firm and/or 
target firm 
February 11, 2007 First Innings: May 6, 2008 
Second Innings: May 26, 2009 
Deal called-off: Sept 30, 2009 
August 16, 2010 
Payment structure of 
the deal (stock/cash, or 
both) 
It refers to the acquiring firm 
payment method in the form of 
cash, stock or both. 
Cash Stock and Cash Cash and Stock 
Deal value (announced) Deal value  US$11.2 billion US$23 billion US$8.67 billion 
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Motive of the acquirer It refers to the various motives of 
acquirer behind involving in 
international acquisition with 
concerned target firm. 
 To achieve emerging markets 
advantage 
 To pursue global diversification  
 To gain market share  
 To gain competitive advantage 
 To improve business value and 
network 
 To gain low-end markets 
advantage 
 To pursue international 
diversification 
 To gain market share 
 To improve economies of 
scale 
 To get benefits from 
technology transfer 
 To hold ownership advantages 
 To access emerging markets 
 To be a conglomerated 
diversification firm 
 To improve business value  
 To gain location advantage 
due to their previous and 
ongoing experience and 
expertise 
 To pursue new business 
opportunities  
Motive of the target It refers to the various motives of 
target firm behind involving in 
international acquisition with 
concerned bidding firm. 
> Better valuation of the firm 
> Significant return on investment 
> To hedge the liability of 
localness in the market 
> To gain low-end markets 
advantage 
> To pursue international 
diversification 
> To gain market share 
> To improve economies of 
scale 
> To get benefits from 
technology transfer 
> To hold ownership 
advantages 
> Better valuation of the firm 
> To prevent from liability of 
localness problems in host 
country  
> To hedge uncertainty in the 
business, heavy government 
control, political intervention 
> To invest in other growth 
markets through the amount 
received from this deal  
Synergistic benefits  It refers to the benefits transferred 
to acquiring firm due to 
participation in deal with the 
concerned target firm. 
Market share, sales, and network 
(number of subscribers) 
Market share, sales, ownership 
advantage, technology benefits, 
and network (number of 
subscribers)  
Improve overall firm value of 
diversified business group 
(e.g., market capitalization)  
C. Determinants of the deal 
Firm-specific attributes It refers to different 
characteristics of acquiring firm: 
status of the company, ownership 
structure, previous acquisition 
experience, and financial 
performance. 
o Ownership benefits 
o International outlook 
o Deep pockets through 
maintaining fire sales 
o Previous acquisition experience 
o Global market share and 
competitive advantage 
o Advanced technology 
Bharti Airtel:  
o Family ownership style 
o Publicly listed firm 
o Market leader in the Indian 
telecom market 
o Local competitive advantage 
o Deep pockets through 
managing fire sales in the 
o Indian origin business group 
o International outlook 
o Previous and ongoing 
experience in doing business 
in India 
o Previous acquisition 
experience in India 
o Experienced management 
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o Internalization and cost cutting 
through integrating various 
markets 
local market 
o No international outlook 
o No prior international 
acquisition experience 
 
MTN Group:  
o Publicly owned though 
government-allied 
shareholders 
o International outlook 
o Product and service 
advantage 
o Technology benefits 
o Deep pockets through 
managing fire sales in the 
local market 
o No previous acquisition 
experience  
o Competitive advantage over 
the African market 
and control 
o Diversified business 
o Economies of scale through 
internalization of various 
businesses 
o Deep pockets and financing 
skills among subsidiary 
firms 
o No previous trading 
experience in oil exploration 
Deal-specific attributes It refers to characteristics of the 
international acquisition: deal 
structure, deal type, payment 
mode, M&A advisors to the deal 
and their previous experience, 
deal breakup fee, non-compete 
fee.  
Offshore acquisition > no territory 
connection with India > cash deal 
> experienced global M&A 
advisors > no information related 
to deal breakup fee and non-
compete fee.  
Cross-border merger > dual 
listing > dual equity structure > 
both stock and cash payment > 
few investment bankers agreed 
to finance the deal > needs 
government approval for open 
offers program > M&A 
advisors somewhat failed to 
materialize the deal > seems to 
that M&A advisors have no 
sophisticated deal making 
experience in emerging markets 
like India and Africa. 
  
> No counter-bids from 
domestic and international 
owners > Vedanta has paid 
non-compete fee, a sum of Rs. 
50 per equity share to Cairn 
Energy for not to operate the 
same business in India, Sri 
Lanka and Bhutan over the 
next three years > both open 
offers program and payment 
structure were confused. 
Country-specific economic and financial market Tax plea > weak legal and Institutional dichotomous law is Higher levels of government 
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attributes indicators, institutional attributes, 
political factors (including 
corruption), accounting, valuation 
and taxation laws, geographical 
factors and cultural factors 
regulatory environment > 
bureaucratic administration > 
erratic behavior of government 
officials including tax department 
> institutional distance between 
two countries for various reasons 
including accounting, taxation, 
and expertise. 
“dual listing” > laws and 
regulations related to M&As > 
political factors including 
bureaucratic administration > 
cultural distance between two 
countries > political influence 
and government intervention of 
two countries. 
control in the given oil 
industry > open offers 
program conflicts with SEBI > 
erratic behavior of institutional 
bodies ministries and 
regulatory bodies > ruling 
political party intervention. 
D. Stock performance around the announcement  
Stock performance of 
acquiring firm 
Positive or negative Vodafone shareholders received 
significant returns on the 
announcement day (12 Feb 2007), 
but not on the day when Vodafone 
won the tax plea case (12 Jan 
2012). 
  
Abnormal return on the 
announcement day was 1.8%. 
Bharti Airtel: 
First innings (6 May 2008):  
Stock price declined by 5.32% 
on the announcement day, 
which was significantly higher 
than the decline in market 
returns 0.92%. 
Second innings (26 May 2009): 
Stock price again crashed by 
4.83% on the announcement 
day, which was higher than the 
decline in market returns 
2.85%. 
Deal cancelled (September 30 
2009): 
Stock price raised by 3.90% on 
October 1, 2009, while market 
returns slightly declined by 
0.01%.  
Vedanta Resources: 
Vedanta shareholders received 
significant higher returns on 
the announcement day 
(4.87%) compared to market 
returns (0.01%). 
 
Stock price gained by 3.11% 
after the immediate 
announcement day. 
Stock performance of 
target firm 
Positive or negative - MTN Group: 
Stock price has increased by 
657 rand (ZAR) due to broken 
negotiations with Bharti Airtel. 
 
Cairn Energy: 
Shareholders experienced 
significant higher returns on 
the announcement day 
(5.32%) compared to market 
returns (0.01%). 
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Stock price found to be 
declined by 1.38% after the 
immediate announcement day. 
 
Cairn India: 
Stock price declined by 6.36% 
on the announcement day that 
was higher than the market 
returns (-0.62%). 
 
Stock returns gained by 1.67% 
on the day after the immediate 
announcement. 
 
In sum, both stocks found to 
be positive for two days before 
the announcement. 
E. Understanding and learning We support the Apex court 
decision that Vodafone is not 
supposed to pay any more capital 
gain taxes to the government in 
the view of Hutchison acquisition. 
 
We argue that the behavior of 
various ministries have influenced 
by politicking for seeking self-
benefit from Vodafone in the form 
of bribe or corruption. 
 
Due to delay in judgment, 
Vodafone’s legal cost might have 
raised for reasons such as legal 
fees and communication cost. 
We argue lack of experience in 
deal making, which linking 
emerging markets unfavorably 
result in deal success. 
 
We suggest that the institutional 
dichotomous behavior of host 
country adversely affects 
inbound deals; at the same time, 
local firms make deals in 
foreign countries to escape 
home country legal and political 
environment. 
We argue that deal has been 
delayed (later, completed) due 
to institutional regime 
accountable for open offers 
program and royalty payments 
because of higher levels of 
government control where 
ONGC has pre-emptive right 
issues. 
 
In addition, ownership choice, 
political factors and 
bureaucratic erratic behavior 
and due diligence issues found 
to be influential attributes. 
F. Implications for host country and multinational The case would be a good lesson The case would help managers We advise that MNCs from 
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managers for countries hosting foreign 
investments and acquisitions.  
 
It would be a piece of policy 
matters for various government 
departments including tax 
authorities, and local 
entrepreneurs, foreign investors, 
and society, as well.  
 
We suggest that acquiring firm 
managers understanding local 
government elite, ruling party 
influence, political intervention, 
government administration will 
make international negotiations 
success in host countries.   
of both acquirer and target 
firms, and M&A advisory firms 
while making future attempts in 
merging countries like India 
and South Africa. 
 
Host country government will 
have special attention on 
revising regulations relating to 
financial markets such as 
international listing, 
mobilization of foreign capital, 
technology transfer, and so 
forth of trade and investment 
related aspects. 
developed and emerging 
countries participating in 
cross-border M&As, 
takeovers, joint ventures and 
alliances should pay more 
attention to due diligence (pre-
emptive rights, contracts, 
contingent issues), and 
country-specific issues 
(institutional norms and 
political and government 
involvement). In fact, 
knowledge on host-country 
administration procedures 
enhances the understanding of 
legal and political 
environment.   
G. Common findings across cases: 
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Firm-specific factors  Two acquiring firms (Vodafone and Vedanta) were based in European Union, UK, listed on 
London Stock Exchange, and have international outlook. 
 Two acquiring firms have come from developed country status. 
 Two acquiring firms (Vodafone and Vedanta) have significant prior acquisition experience. 
 Two acquiring firms (Vodafone and Vedanta) have sophisticated management expertise. 
 All firms participating in acquisitions have considerable cash reserves or deep pockets.  
 The common motive behind all acquiring firms was to improve business value by expanding the 
existing product and market portfolio into emerging markets. 
 
Deal-specific factors  All three deals were cross-continental acquisitions. 
 Two deals were appeared in the same continental of Europe (Vodafone, Vedanta)  
 Two deals were delayed at pre-merger negotiations (Bharti Airtel-MTN, Vedanta-Cairn India). 
 Two deals were successful in which acquiring firms have come from developed countries. 
 Two deals were successful, and from the same home country, UK (Vodafone, Vedanta). 
 Two deals were cross-border inbound acquisitions, horizontal category (Vodafone-Hutchison, 
Vedanta- Cairn India). 
 Two deals were related to telecommunications business (Vodafone-Hutchison, Bharti Airtel-MTN 
Group). 
 Two deals (Vodafone-Hutchison, Vedanta-Cairn India) that ‘inward nature’ have focused on 
ownership benefits and equity interest (more than 50% equity capital). 
 All three deals targeted on controlling and management of the post-acquisition firm. 
 Two deals (Vedanta-Cairn India, Bharti Airtel-MTN) have exercised the mixed payment option 
that is cash and stock. 
 All three deals were significantly higher in terms of deal value that is more than US$9 billion 
(average of three deals equals to US$14.6 billion). 
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Country-specific determinants  The distance between host country and home country was common for two deals (Vodafone, 
Vedanta). 
 All three deals were publicly attention through media (print and electronic). 
 All three deals were injected by erratic behavior of government authorities. 
 Underdeveloped institutional laws and provisions dejected all three deals. 
 Two deals have been litigated by ruling political party intervention. 
 Two deals were attracted the attention of SEBI in lieu of open offers program under the SAST 
Regulations, 1997 or Takeover Code. 
 All three deals were bigger in terms of deal value, which influenced by ruling party politicians for 
self benefits or corruption.  
  The important, common finding of the research is that government officials’ erratic nature and 
ruling political party influence would be more in foreign inward deals that characterize higher bid 
value, listed company, and cash payment. 
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Appendix 1. Indian telecom services performance indicators 
 Description 2002 
December 
2005 
December 
2006
[a]
 
December 
2011 
December 
2012 
June 
I. Subscriber’s base (in millions) 
1 Wireline 38.33 48.84 40.30 
 
32.69 31.43 
2 Wireless 
(GSM and CDMA) 
6.54 75.94 149.62 893.84 934.09 
3 Gross total 
(Rate of growth %)
[b]
 
44.87 124.78 (178) 189.92  
(52) 
926.53 (388) 965.52 
(4) 
II. Traffic 
4 Mobile: GSM (CDMA)  
[minutes of use/ sub/month] 
210 393 (462) 454 (424) 332 (226) 346 (229) 
III. Average revenue per user 
5 Wireless 
[INR (US$)/sub/month]
[e]
 
871  
(15.92)  
GSM: 362 
(6.61) 
CDMA: 256 
(4.68) 
GSM: 316 
(5.77) 
CDMA: 196 
(3.58) 
GSM: 95.77 
 (1.75) 
CDMA: 
73.46 (1.34) 
GSM: 95.47 
(1.74) 
CDMA: 
74.90 (1.37) 
IV. Teledensity 
6 Population in million 
(estimated) 
1048 1092 1107 1206 1213 
7 Wireline 3.66 4.47 3.64 2.71 2.59 
8 Wireless 0.62 6.95 13.52 74.15 76.99 
9 Gross total 
(Rate of growth %)
[b]
 
4.28 11.43  
(167) 
17.16  
(50) 
76.86  
(348) 
79.58  
(3.5) 
V. Internet  subscriber’s base (in millions)  
10 Internet: broadband - 6.70 8.58 22.39; 
wireless: 
431.37 
23.01; 
wireless: 
460.84 
11 Minutes of use  
(MOU/ subs/month)  
 
- 189 190 
[c] [c] 
12 Average revenue per user  
(INR (US$)/subs/month)
[e]
  
- 210  
(3.84) 
205  
(3.75) 
[c] [c] 
VI. Hutch-Essar Limited (now, Vodafone India Limited) gross information 
13 Wireless subscriber base (in 
millions) 
[Rate of growth %] 
2.02  11.41 
(465%) 
23.31 
(104%) 
147.75 
(534%) 
153.71 
(4%) 
14 Market share (%)
[d]
 18.75 15.03 22.12 16.53 16.46 
15 Market leader (position) 3 4 3 3 3 
16 Gross revenue  (US$ billions)
[e]
 - - - 1.49 1.54 
Source: Compiled from TRAI for the years 2004, 2007 and 2012 (http://www.trai.gov.in/).  
Notes:  
[a] We assume that Hutchison could have operated until February 2007 and then Vodafone would have started from that period, because the deal has announced in 
media in February, thus finally completed in May 2007 (see VGP-AR, 2007).  
[b] We compute rate of growth based on gross total, for instance, rate of growth for the year ended December 2006 would be “((value of the year 2006 – value of 
the year 2005)/ value of the year 2005) × 100”.  
[c] The total revenue of the internet services as reported by ISPs was US$ 0.52 billion for the quarter ending Jun-12 as compared to US$ 0.53 billion for the quarter 
ending Mar-12, showing a decrease of 3.27% (TRAI, 2012).  
[d] Market share based on ‘number of mobile subscribers’; In India, most of the market share is gained by Indian-origin conglomerates Bharti Airtel (1st position 
with 20.05%), Reliance (2nd position with 16.55%), and then Vodafone (3rd position with 16.46%), followed by Idea (4th position with 12.54%) ... and BSNL, 
among others.  
[e] The amount expressed in Indian currency has converted into US dollars at the exchange rate INR 54.72 (Dated: November 06, 2012); moreover, 40% 
Vodafone’s revenue comes from the rural sector, and the remaining from urban and semi-urban.  
[f] As of June 2012, there are 14 (GSM and CDMA) service providers and eight wireline providers in India. 
[g] From March 2012 onward, Vodafone had entered Fixed-line services, and it does not provide CDMA services. Indeed, it is permitted all over India. Further, it is 
one of the 21 operators in international long distance service licensees in India (TRAI, 2012). 
[h] See the overview of Indian telecommunications market during 2011-2012 (TRAI, 2012, pp. i-ii). 
[i] Abbreviations: ARPU – average revenue per user; CDMA – code division multiple access; GSM – global systems for mobile communications; INR – Indian 
rupee is the official currency of India; ISP – internet service provider; MOU – minutes of use; TRAI – telecom regulatory authority of India. 
 
